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Why is a person who kills exempt from kofer (ransom payment) while an ox that kills must pay? The shiur develops the principle that Talmud (תלמוד) v'Heskeid teaches that the maase (action) itself creates liability, not the aveira—so any hakah (blow) to a person exempts from kofer, whether meizid, shogeg, or even oness, just as an animal's liability extends to all forms of nezek.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya in Bava Kamma 4a regarding the machlokes between dinei adam hamozek (a person who damages) and dinei shor hamozek (an ox that damages). The Gemara (גמרא) asks why we cannot learn out the din of adam from shor: if a shor that kills pays kofer, shouldn't adam who kills also pay kofer? The Gemara answers that shor has a chumra—when a shor kills a person, the owner pays kofer. But the Gemara's logic seems perplexing: if we're trying to learn adam shehizik shor from shor shehizik shor, why mention the chumra of shor shehizik adam? The shiur raises fundamental questions about the structure of this sevara. The shiur challenges the entire conceptual framework of the Gemara's question. How can we even contemplate learning adam's liability from shor's liability? Adam is personally responsible for his actions, while shor represents liability for one's property. There is no logical sevara to extend personal liability (adam hamozek) to monetary liability (shor hamozek)—these are fundamentally different categories. Yet the Gemara treats this as a legitimate limud that requires a pircha to reject it.
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Bava Kamma 4a
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