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Why does the Mishna obligate payment when a thief slaughters on Yom Kippur but not on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur unpacks the Gemara (גמרא)'s distinction between loka meshalam and meisa meshalam, arguing that meisa is kol (includes everything), and traces the textual analysis of whether one is liable when a shaliach performs the slaughter. A key yesod emerges: the slaughter must be a continuation of the geneivah itself, not merely a permitted act of shechita.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Bava Kamma 61a regarding the liability of a thief who slaughters a stolen animal on Shabbos (שבת) versus Yom Kippur. The Gemara (גמרא)'s question centers on why Rabbi Meir in the Mishna obligates payment when a thief slaughters on Yom Kippur but not on Shabbos, given that both carry a potential death penalty. The shiur explores several interrelated kashas and their resolutions. The fundamental question is whether Rabbi Meir holds by the principle of loka meshalam (one who is liable for lashes does not pay monetary compensation) and if so, should he also hold meisa meshalam (one liable for capital punishment does not pay). The Gemara initially suggests that there is a chiluk (distinction) between these two principles. Rashi (רש"י) and the Rishonim explain that meisa meshalam operates differently because when one receives the death penalty, it is nichla—encompassing everything, kol (all). The person has received the ultimate punishment, which includes any monetary penalty.
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Bava Kamma 61a
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
