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What defines muktzeh—intent to use, or the object's status as food? The Ran holds an object must be an ochel at twilight to avoid muktzeh; preparation alone is insufficient. The Ba'al HaMaor disagrees: intention to use is enough. The shiur analyzes how this dispute shapes the halakhah of milking an animal on Shabbos (שבת) and why the Rambam (רמב"ם) rules it is patur aval asur.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Beitzah 2a, focusing on the fundamental disagreement between the Ran and the Ba'al HaMaor concerning the nature of muktzeh and its application to milking an animal on Shabbos (שבת). The Gemara (גמרא)'s central question revolves around an egg laid on Yom Tov. The Ran begins by asking: why is the egg not muktzeh simply because the mother hen is muktzeh? He proves from Gemara in Shabbos and Yoma that when the mother is muktzeh, the offspring is not automatically muktzeh. The Ran concludes the problem is nolad (something newly created), not muktzeh transfer. His answer: since the mother hen designated for egg-laying is an ochel (food item), and the egg was latent within her, the egg is not considered nolad. Conversely, a hen designated for milk production (metaphorically speaking—the shiur uses the example of an animal designated for milking) is not an ochel, so its product is nolad and thus muktzeh.
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Beitzah 2a
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