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How does "lo efter min ha'olam ad she'ehye nazir" create a valid nezirus obligation? The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds that a neder requires actual chalus — something must be chal (take effect) for the commitment to be real. The shiur shows that this nezirus becomes chal specifically for the moment before death, creating an immediate sofek obligation to observe nezirus dinim now, and explaining the unique relationship between the neder to accept nezirus and the formal kabalas nezirus itself.
This shiur analyzes Masechta Nedarim 3b-4a, focusing on the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of the case where someone says "lo efter min ha'olam ad she'ehye nazir" (I will not leave this world without being a nazir). The central question is understanding how this creates a valid nezirus obligation and when bal tachar (the prohibition against delaying fulfillment of vows) applies. The shiur begins by examining an apparent contradiction in the Rambam. In Hilchos Nezirus (Perek Alef, Halacha (הלכה) Daled), the Rambam states "harei ze nazir miyad" — he is a nazir immediately. Yet the Rambam also says that if he delays his nezirus, he violates bal tachar. This seems contradictory: the Gemara (גמרא) establishes that when nezirus is chal (takes effect) immediately, there cannot be bal tachar, since there is nothing to delay. The only way bal tachar applies is when there is nazirus d'tirta (a future nezirus that one must actively accept). How can the Rambam hold both that the person is a nazir immediately AND that there is bal tachar?
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Nedarim 3b-4a
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