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Can partial speech (yad) create kiddushin, and what is the source for this din? The shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute: the Ran holds we cannot derive yad for kiddushin from mamatzeir because "ein onshin min hadin," while Tosafos (תוספות) and the Rosh argue that yad works by kiddushin based on the parallel to hekdesh. The analysis explores complex cases of implied agency and partial commitments in kiddushin.
This shiur examines Nedarim 6b and the fundamental question of whether yad (partial or implied speech) creates valid kiddushin. The Gemara (גמרא)'s central inquiry is whether we can learn yad bekiddushin from other areas of halacha (הלכה), particularly from mamatzeir (one who donates property to the Beis Hamikdash) or from nazirus. The Ran takes the position that ein onshin min hadin from a mamatzeir—we cannot derive halachic principles from that case—and therefore we cannot learn yad for nedarim from mamatzeir or nazirus. The Ran holds that by mamatzeir itself, the principle of ein onshin min hadin applies. This creates a fundamental problem: if the Gemara is trying to learn yad bekiddushin from mamatzeir, how can this be reconciled with the ein onshin min hadin principle?
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Nedarim 6b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
