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Why doesn't kiddushin spread from half the woman to the whole, as hekdesh spreads from half an animal to the entire animal? The shiur examines the Gemara (גמרא)'s answer—da'as acheret blocks hispashtus—and explores the machlokes Rishonim: Tosafos (תוספות) limits the din to the lashon "mekudeshes," while others (Rashba, Rivash) apply it broadly. The analysis distinguishes two chiddushim in the pasuk: the Torah (תורה)'s rejection of partial hekdesh, and the mechanism of hispashtus when intention conflicts with effect.
The Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 7b asks why kiddushin should not spread throughout the entire woman when a man attempts to be mekadesh only half of her, parallel to the principle of hispashtus by hekdesh: if one designates half an animal as an olah, the entire animal becomes kodesh. The Gemara answers that by hekdesh the owner has full control over his animal, whereas by kiddushin the woman's da'as is required—and her da'as prevents the kiddushin from spreading beyond what she consented to. Tosafos (תוספות) and the Ran challenge this answer: if we ignore the man's limited intention (he wanted only half) and extend the kiddushin based on hispashtus, why should we not likewise ignore her limited intention and extend it from her perspective as well? Both wanted half; why should hispashtus work from his side but not hers?
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Kiddushin 7b
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