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Can a nignav (theft victim) be makdish a stolen object after the ganav decides to return it? The Ba'al HaMaor permits it while the Ramban (רמב"ן) objects based on kinyan genevah. The shiur develops that kinyan genevah doesn't remove the owner's fundamental ownership status—only the object's reshus changes—and explores the distinction between the prohibitions of geneivah (property violation) and gezeilah (personal affront).
The shiur opens with a machloket between the Ba'al HaMaor and Ramban (רמב"ן) regarding a case in early Bava Kamma. If someone steals an object and then decides to return it, can the nignav (victim) be makdish (consecrate) it while it's still in the ganav's possession? The Ba'al HaMaor rules that the nignav can be makdish it, while the Ramban challenges this position on the grounds that the ganav retains kinyan genevah until actual return, making it ein b'reshuso of the victim and therefore unable to be consecrated. Rabbi Zweig analyzes two possible understandings of ein b'reshuso. If ein b'reshuso means ein shelo (not his property), then the Ramban's objection is compelling—kinyan genevah creates a deficiency in ownership. However, if ein b'reshuso is a technical issue of physical location without affecting fundamental ownership, the Ba'al HaMaor's position becomes tenable. The shiur suggests that kinyan genevah does not make the object ein shelo; the victim remains the ikar ba'al (primary owner). The ganav's kinyan is not equal to true ownership. Once the ganav decides to return the object, he becomes like a shomer holding it for the owner, restoring the reshus aspect needed for hekdesh.
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Bava Kamma 53b
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