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How does the principle of arvus (guarantorship) create marriage obligations? The shiur analyzes whether arvus means the woman receives actual monetary benefit when someone spends on her behalf, or whether she receives validation when the man trusts her self-imposed obligation. Two approaches in the Rishonim yield different practical consequences for whether she can withdraw from kiddushin.
This shiur presents an advanced analysis of Kiddushin 6b, examining the fundamental nature of arvus (guarantorship) as a mechanism for marriage acquisition. Rabbi Zweig begins by questioning why the Gemara (גמרא) requires the din of arav when a man instructs someone to give a gift on his behalf to effect kiddushin. When he asks "Ten maneh le'ploni" (give money to so-and-so), he is surely obligating himself to reimburse the expenditure—so why is the Torah (תורה) principle of arvus necessary to establish this obligation? The shiur explores a foundational question: What exactly is arvus? The conventional understanding is that arvus applies when one person performs an action or spends money on behalf of another, creating an obligation for reimbursement. But this raises a difficulty: in Hilchos Mechira (Laws of Sales), the Rambam (רמב"ם) presents a startling case where someone obligates himself in money even though no one gave him anything. A person who says "I am obligated to you for 100 dinars" before witnesses creates a binding monetary obligation, even though everyone—including the witnesses—knows he never borrowed anything. The Rambam states this is derived from the din of arav. How can this be arvus when the fundamental element of receiving something is absent?
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Kiddushin 6b
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