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Why doesn't kiddushin with a loan (mekadeish b'milvah) work, yet the benefit of forgiving a loan (hana'as mechilas milvah) does? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: hana'ah alone cannot create kiddushin because it generates no reciprocal obligation. Only when the woman explicitly accepts (hiskayves) to pay for the service being rendered—forgiving the debt or extending its term—does she create the monetary value necessary for valid kiddushin.
The shiur addresses a fundamental difficulty in Masechta Kiddushin concerning the mechanism by which hana'as mechilas milvah (the benefit of forgiving a loan) effects kiddushin, while direct kiddushin with a loan (mekadeish b'milvah) does not work. The question becomes particularly acute in light of the principle that kinyan moel, kinyan ein moel—if one form of acquisition doesn't work, another valid form present in the same transaction should take effect. Since forgiving a loan provides tangible benefit worth money, why can't every attempted kiddushin with a loan work based on that benefit? Rashi (רש"י)'s approach establishes that one cannot be mekadesh with hana'ah (mere benefit) because it creates no reciprocal legal obligation. When someone gives you hana'ah without your prior agreement to pay, you owe them nothing in return. This is the defining characteristic of mavri achari (one who chases away danger)—even though you benefit when someone removes a threat from you, you are not legally obligated to compensate them unless you explicitly hired them for that service. The hana'ah itself, while real and valuable, is not "kesef" for purposes of kiddushin because it doesn't create a chiyuv (obligation) to pay.
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Kiddushin 6b
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