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Why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) rule both nasan hi v'amar hu and nasan hu v'amra hi are invalid kiddushin? The shiur demonstrates that nasan hi v'amar hu fails because we cannot know the giver's intent, while nasan hu v'amra hi fails because the man must actively give (not merely have the woman take). A profound analysis of Rashi (רש"י)'s understanding of safek kiddushin follows: mid'oraysa she is treated as the first man's wife, yet kiddushin from a second man may not be chol mid'oraysa—requiring gittin from both only mid'Rabbanan.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya on Kiddushin 5b dealing with nasan hu v'amra hi and nasan hi v'amar hu, focusing on the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s psak and Rashi (רש"י)'s revolutionary interpretation of safek kiddushin. The Rambam in Hilchos Ishus (Perek Gimel, Halacha (הלכה) Beis) rules that both nasan hi v'amar hu (she gives, he says harei at mekudeshes li) and nasan hu v'amra hi (he gives, she says harei ani mekudeshes lach) are invalid as kiddushin. The shiur addresses a fundamental question: if the Rambam invalidates nasan hi v'amar hu because the man didn't perform the act of giving (ma'aseh kinyan), why does he also need to invalidate nasan hu v'amra hi? And if the problem with nasan hi v'amar hu is that we don't know what the woman intends (since her amirah cannot define her netinah), then how could nasan hu v'amra hi ever be a safek—it should be vadai pasul for the same reason.
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Kiddushin 5b
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