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Can a reversible change (shinui achoz l'briyosa) create a kinyan? The Gemara (גמרא) in Sukkah examining hoshana and lulav establishes that shinui achoz l'briyosa is not a shinui—yet separately asks about shinui hashem (ה׳). The shiur develops a fundamental chakira: shinui maase means the Torah (תורה) is machshiv the act itself (like writing a get or binding a lulav), not merely the result, distinguishing it from mere shinui hashem where only the product changes.
The shiur analyzes a foundational question in hilchos gezeila and kinyanim: what constitutes a valid shinui (change) that transfers ownership? The focus is on the concept of shinui achoz l'briyosa—a change that can be reversed—and whether it can effect a kinyan. The discussion begins with Bava Kamma 56b and the case of Meirish (a beam stolen and built into a house). Rav Zeira establishes that shinui achoz l'briyosa lo sh'mei shinui—a reversible change is not considered a true change. The Gemara (גמרא) in Sukkah (cited extensively) presents a parallel case: if avodah zarah worshipers steal branches and bind them into a lulav, can they be koneh through shinui maase? The Gemara initially suggests they should be koneh through shinui maase, but answers that lulav ain tzorech agud—binding the lulav is not me'akev, and therefore shinui achoz l'briyosa doesn't work.
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Bava Kamma 56b
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