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Why can't a man be mekadesh a woman with a debt he forgives? The shiur develops Rashi (רש"י)'s position that kidushin requires a physical transfer (kichah mishtai Efron), not just legal obligation. A deep analysis of Rashi-Tosfos dispute emerges: when is forgiving extended payment time considered ribis, and does the money need actual physical transfer to create kedushin?
This shiur provides an intensive analysis of Kiddushin 6b, focusing on the Mishna's ruling that HaMekadesh B'Milveh (one who betroths with a loan) ein mekudeshes (she is not betrothed). Rabbi Zweig begins with a fundamental question on Rashi (רש"י): why does Rashi cite the gezeirah shavah of "kichah kichah mishtai Efron" to explain why milveh doesn't work for kidushin? The simple answer would seem to be that milveh is not kesef—since milveh lo tzo nitna (a loan is not considered given), there is no money physically present at the time of kidushin. Rabbi Zweig proposes a fundamental distinction between hilchos kinyanim (acquisition law) and hilchos kidushin. According to the Rambam (רמב"ם) in Hilchos Kinyan, milveh lo tzo nitna is not a barrier to kinyan karka (acquiring land) or even creates a mishpara (binding obligation) for metaltelim (movable property). In other words, for standard monetary transactions, forgiving a debt counts as payment. If this is true for kinyanim, why shouldn't it work for kidushin?
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Kiddushin 6b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
