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When milah is performed on Shabbos (שבת) for a sick child requiring warm water, is warming the water considered a justified melacha or does it exempt the mitzvah (מצוה) of milah entirely? The shiur analyzes when an issur is docheh (pushed aside) versus when the mitzvah itself is patur, exploring the Baal HaMaor-Ramban (רמב"ן) debate and its implications for marbeh b'shiur in kitzur.
The shiur opens with a complex analysis of performing milah on Shabbos (שבת) when a child is sick and water must be warmed. The central question is whether warming water on Shabbos for milah renders the milah itself non-binding (patur from the mitzvah (מצוה)), or whether it is simply an issur that must be pushed aside (docheh) for the sake of pikuach nefesh. According to the Baal HaMaor, if milah can only be performed by being mechallel Shabbos to warm the water, the milah itself does not override Shabbos (ain docheh Shabbos) because one is not yet obligated in the mitzvah—warming the water is permitted only due to sakana (danger), not the mitzvah of milah itself. The Ramban (רמב"ן) disagrees, arguing that the obligation to perform milah remains, but the means are restricted by other halachic considerations. Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental distinction: when the issur preventing the mitzvah is within the mitzvah itself (e.g., v'chai bahem—"you shall live by them," which exempts mitzvos in cases of pikuach nefesh), one is patur from the mitzvah entirely. But when the issur is external (such as chilul Shabbos as a separate prohibition), one remains obligated in the mitzvah, and the issur is merely docheh (set aside). This framework resolves the challenge of the Shagas Aryeh regarding milah performed before the eighth day (kodem zman): if the child is actually a ben shivah (seven-day-old) mistakenly thought to be a ben shemoneh, and milah is performed on Shabbos, why isn't one obligated in a korban for chilul Shabbos? According to the Ramah, milah kodem zman does not require hatafas dam bris, suggesting one is yotzei the mitzvah. The Shagas Aryeh asks: if so, this should be a case of lo ya'aseh v'aseh mitzvah, yet one is patur from a korban. Rabbi Zweig suggests that milah kodem zman means one is not yet obligated in the mitzvah at all—there is no chiyuv yet, and therefore no mitzvah to fulfill, making it fundamentally different from milah she'lo bizmanah (after the eighth day), where the obligation exists but is simply blocked by Shabbos.
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Gittin 8b
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