No community start suggestion yet.
Why is a single witness believed regarding prohibited foods? The shiur analyzes Gittin 2b's principle of "eid echad neeman b'isurim," distinguishing between ischazak issur (established prohibition) and ikvei issur (juxtaposed prohibited items). Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) disagree fundamentally: Tosafos holds b'yado makes something "not ischazak," while the Ramban (רמב"ן) maintains b'yado enables testimony even against an ischazak.
This shiur delivers a deep analysis of Gittin 2b, focusing on the Talmudic principle that a single witness (eid echad) is believed regarding prohibitions (isurim). The central question is: under what circumstances does this credibility apply, and what role does b'yado (within one's power/control) play in establishing credibility? Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s approach across multiple sugyos. Rashi in Chulin and Yoma derives eid echad neeman b'isurim from a pasuk, while in Yevamos Rashi presents it as a logical sevara—otherwise no one could trust anyone, not even in their own household. The Gemara (גמרא)'s statement appears to limit this credibility to cases of "lo ischazak issur" (not an established prohibition), raising the question of what happens when there is an ischazak issur.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 2b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
