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Why is a single witness believed regarding prohibited foods? The shiur analyzes Gittin 2b's principle of "eid echad neeman b'isurim," distinguishing between ischazak issur (established prohibition) and ikvei issur (juxtaposed prohibited items). Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) disagree fundamentally: Tosafos holds b'yado makes something "not ischazak," while the Ramban (רמב"ן) maintains b'yado enables testimony even against an ischazak.
This shiur delivers a deep analysis of Gittin 2b, focusing on the Talmudic principle that a single witness (eid echad) is believed regarding prohibitions (isurim). The central question is: under what circumstances does this credibility apply, and what role does b'yado (within one's power/control) play in establishing credibility? Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s approach across multiple sugyos. Rashi in Chulin and Yoma derives eid echad neeman b'isurim from a pasuk, while in Yevamos Rashi presents it as a logical sevara—otherwise no one could trust anyone, not even in their own household. The Gemara (גמרא)'s statement appears to limit this credibility to cases of "lo ischazak issur" (not an established prohibition), raising the question of what happens when there is an ischazak issur.
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Gittin 2b
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