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Why does the Torah (תורה) need a pasuk to teach that shaveh kesef (equivalent value) works for kiddushin? The shiur explores competing Rishonim frameworks: whether the issue is that shaveh kesef lacks intrinsic value (making hasgamah create worth), or that it's not the specific object the Torah required. The conclusion distinguishes between Tosfos's cheftza-based approach and other Rishonim's value-based understanding.
This intensive Gemara (גמרא) shiur on Kiddushin 3a examines the fundamental question of shaveh kesef ki-kesef—why the Torah (תורה) requires a pasuk to teach that an object worth the value of kesef (silver/money) can effect kiddushin. The Gemara asks several kushyos: if the Torah says kesef, we should know that shaveh kesef works; additionally, why specify "shaveh kesef" when just saying "kesef" would suffice; and finally, we already learn shaveh kesef from the case of eved Ivri (Hebrew servant). Rabbi Zweig begins by mapping the terrain of Rishonim. The Ramban (רמב"ן), Rashba, and Ran all ask these fundamental questions, and Tosfos adds additional difficulties from the case of the kohen (who accepted an agol for pidyon haben) and from the Braisa itself which validates shaveh kesef. A critical question emerges: we accept ledavdis shevel (personal valuation)—that if something is worth more to you than the market price, that subjective value counts for mitzvos like pidyon haben—yet Tosfos demands a pasuk for shaveh kesef ki-kesef even at market value. How can personal valuation create halachic value without any pasuk, while market-value equivalence requires scriptural authorization?
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Kiddushin 3a
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