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Can a shevuah take effect on something already forbidden by rabbinic decree? The Gemara (גמרא)'s treatment of Reish Lakish's view—that a shevuah is chal on a chatzi shiur of neveilah because midoraisa it is mutar—presents serious textual difficulties: the Gemara appears to answer with "v'chiteima" (usually a rejected premise), and the apparent contradiction with later Amoraim Rav Papa and Rav Acha bar Yaakov requires resolution.
This shiur analyzes Gemara (גמרא) Yoma 73b, which explores the question of whether a shevuah (oath) can take effect on something that is already forbidden by rabbinic law. The Gemara discusses the case of a person who swears not to eat neveilah or other forbidden foods. The central issue is: since neveilah is already forbidden (at minimum by rabbinic decree of lo sasur—not to deviate from rabbinic rulings), how can a shevuah take effect on it? Can one bring a korban shevuos for violating such an oath? Reish Lakish holds that in the case of eating a chatzi shiur (less than the minimum prohibited measure) of neveilah, one can be liable for a korban shevuos. The logic is that midoraisa (from Torah (תורה) law), a chatzi shiur is permitted—the prohibition exists only miderabbanan (rabbinically). Since the Torah-level status is "mutar min heter" (permitted), the shevuah can be chal (take effect). This position assumes that when something is only rabbinically forbidden but Torah-permitted, a personal oath can still create liability.
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Yoma 73b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
