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Can a shevuah take effect on something already forbidden by rabbinic decree? The Gemara (גמרא)'s treatment of Reish Lakish's view—that a shevuah is chal on a chatzi shiur of neveilah because midoraisa it is mutar—presents serious textual difficulties: the Gemara appears to answer with "v'chiteima" (usually a rejected premise), and the apparent contradiction with later Amoraim Rav Papa and Rav Acha bar Yaakov requires resolution.
This shiur analyzes Gemara (גמרא) Yoma 73b, which explores the question of whether a shevuah (oath) can take effect on something that is already forbidden by rabbinic law. The Gemara discusses the case of a person who swears not to eat neveilah or other forbidden foods. The central issue is: since neveilah is already forbidden (at minimum by rabbinic decree of lo sasur—not to deviate from rabbinic rulings), how can a shevuah take effect on it? Can one bring a korban shevuos for violating such an oath? Reish Lakish holds that in the case of eating a chatzi shiur (less than the minimum prohibited measure) of neveilah, one can be liable for a korban shevuos. The logic is that midoraisa (from Torah (תורה) law), a chatzi shiur is permitted—the prohibition exists only miderabbanan (rabbinically). Since the Torah-level status is "mutar min heter" (permitted), the shevuah can be chal (take effect). This position assumes that when something is only rabbinically forbidden but Torah-permitted, a personal oath can still create liability.
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Yoma 73b
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