A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why can't a deaf-mute (ileim) deliver a get with the required declaration "befanai nechta u'fanai nechtam"? The shiur develops two fundamental approaches: the ileim's disqualification stems not from a deficiency in the person (psul haguf) but from a credibility issue (chashash meshachah). The Rambam (רמב"ם) requires testimony in Beis Din to ensure integrity; the Rabbeinu Tam permits written testimony even outside Beis Din, while the Ran argues the entire declaration is merely ed echad ne'eman b'isurim, not formal testimony.
This shiur addresses a fundamental question in Hilchos Gittin: why is a deaf-mute (ileim) disqualified from serving as the agent to bring a get and make the required declaration "befanai nechta u'fanai nechtam" (it was written and signed before me)? The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether a cheresh (deaf person) or ileim could fulfill this role, and the question becomes: if an ileim can write down his testimony, why shouldn't written testimony suffice? The Tosafos (תוספות) and Rambam (רמב"ם) both appear to hold that an ileim cannot write down "befanai nechta u'fanai nechtam." The Rambam in Hilchos Geirushin 7:18 states that if the agent failed to make the declaration orally, the get is still valid through its chazakah (presumption of validity), but the agent should not simply write down the declaration afterward. This suggests that written testimony is insufficient. The Ran (on the Rif) also states that an ileim could testify in writing (ksav mochiach alav), yet still seems to hold that this doesn't work for the get delivery.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 23a-b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
