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Why can't a deaf-mute (ileim) deliver a get with the required declaration "befanai nechta u'fanai nechtam"? The shiur develops two fundamental approaches: the ileim's disqualification stems not from a deficiency in the person (psul haguf) but from a credibility issue (chashash meshachah). The Rambam (רמב"ם) requires testimony in Beis Din to ensure integrity; the Rabbeinu Tam permits written testimony even outside Beis Din, while the Ran argues the entire declaration is merely ed echad ne'eman b'isurim, not formal testimony.
This shiur addresses a fundamental question in Hilchos Gittin: why is a deaf-mute (ileim) disqualified from serving as the agent to bring a get and make the required declaration "befanai nechta u'fanai nechtam" (it was written and signed before me)? The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether a cheresh (deaf person) or ileim could fulfill this role, and the question becomes: if an ileim can write down his testimony, why shouldn't written testimony suffice? The Tosafos (תוספות) and Rambam (רמב"ם) both appear to hold that an ileim cannot write down "befanai nechta u'fanai nechtam." The Rambam in Hilchos Geirushin 7:18 states that if the agent failed to make the declaration orally, the get is still valid through its chazakah (presumption of validity), but the agent should not simply write down the declaration afterward. This suggests that written testimony is insufficient. The Ran (on the Rif) also states that an ileim could testify in writing (ksav mochiach alav), yet still seems to hold that this doesn't work for the get delivery.
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Gittin 23a-b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
