A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
When two sets of witnesses contradict each other, does that contradiction (hakasha) begin the process of impeachment (hazama)? The shiur analyzes the machlokes between Rav and Rava regarding hakasha techilas hazama, exploring whether the defining factor is the continued existence of the court verdict or the Torah (תורה)'s principle of believing the second pair only when justice requires correction. Two fundamentally different conceptual frameworks for eidus zomemim emerge from this analysis.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of the sugya in Bava Kamma 63b-64a concerning hakasha techilas hazama—whether a simple contradiction (hakasha) between two sets of witnesses constitutes the beginning of the hazama impeachment process. The central machlokes is between Rav and Rava, with Rav holding that hakasha is NOT techilas hazama, while Rava maintains that it is. The shiur opens by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s presentation of the case: two witnesses testify that someone committed murder (harag), then two other witnesses say he did not (lo harag). The question is raised: why does Rashi present such a complex case with three pairs of witnesses when a simpler scenario could have been used? This leads into the fundamental question of what exactly is at stake in the machlokes.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Bava Kamma 63b-64a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
