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What does it mean when someone says "half of me be married to you" or "marry half of you"? The Gemara (גמרא) initially suggests this violates "ish v'lo chatzi ish" (a man, not half a man) and "isha v'lo chatzi isha" (a woman, not half a woman). The shiur examines whether the maskana learns these as actual pesukim prohibiting partial kiddushin, or merely as expressions meaning "I want to marry someone else too," and explores the major dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) on how to understand this sugya.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 7a, which presents the enigmatic case of someone attempting to create a kiddushin relationship with "half" of a person. The Gemara (גמרא) states: "Amar lah 'hiskadshi li l'chatzi'" (he says "be married to half of me") — she is mekudeshes; but "chatzyach mekudeshes li" (half of you be married to me) — she is not mekudeshes. The Gemara's initial explanation is "ish amar rachmana v'lo chatzi ish" (the Torah (תורה) says "a man" not "half a man") and similarly "isha v'lo chatzi isha" (a woman, not half a woman). Rabbi Zweig identifies a fundamental machloket Rishonim in understanding the Gemara's maskana. The Gemara concludes "itzla b'trei lo chazi, v'gavar li lo chazi b'trei" — a woman cannot be married to two men, but a man can be married to two women. The question is whether this maskana completely replaces the earlier drasha from pesukim, or whether both the pesukim and this svara remain operative as independent halachos.
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Kiddushin 7a
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