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When a thief steals an item and the owner despairs of recovering it, can the thief acquire the item itself, or only owe money? The shiur examines Rashi (רש"י)'s two possible explanations: either the thief can insist on returning the actual item even after acquiring it through yesh, or giving money constitutes fulfillment of v'heishiv because the owner despaired only of the object, not its value.
This shiur presents a deep analysis of the sugya in Bava Kama 56a regarding the mechanism of yesh (despair) in cases of theft and whether it enables the thief to acquire the stolen object. The central question is whether yesh allows the thief to keep the physical object or only creates an obligation to pay monetary value. Rabbi Zweig explores two fundamental approaches to understanding Rashi (רש"י)'s position. According to the first reading, even after yesh kona (despair confers acquisition), the thief can still insist on returning the actual stolen object to fulfill v'heishiv es ha'gezeila (the mitzvah (מצוה) to return the theft). This is because the item remains "what was stolen from you" regardless of technical ownership transfer. The second reading suggests that once the thief acquires through yesh, he cannot return the object, but paying money constitutes a valid fulfillment of v'heishiv because the owner's despair was specifically regarding the object, not its monetary value.
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Bava Kama 56a
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