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How does declaring an object hekdesh work when it's not yet in your possession? The Ran requires kinyan dalet amos plus kedushas peh, creating a dual mechanism where you acquire ownership to transfer it while sanctifying it. The Rosh disagrees, holding that hekdesh creates an issur directly without requiring prior kinyan, making the ownership follow the sanctification rather than the reverse.
This shiur presents an intricate analysis of Nedarim 34b, exploring the fundamental mechanics of declaring an object hekdesh (consecrated property) and the din of being a gizbar (treasurer of hekdesh). The central question addressed is: when a person declares an object hekdesh that is within his dalet amos but not yet in his physical possession, what makes him or prevents him from becoming a gizbar? The Ran's position is developed at length. According to the Ran, there is a critical distinction between declaring hekdesh an object that is already in one's house (chatzer) versus declaring hekdesh an object that is merely within one's dalet amos. When an object is in one's house and one declares it hekdesh, the person becomes a gizbar—responsible for the hekdesh property. However, when declaring hekdesh an object in one's dalet amos but not in one's physical possession, there is no din of me'ilah if one picks it up and moves it (without eating it), because the person does not become a gizbar.
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Nedarim 34b
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