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The Gemara (גמרא) lists six halachos common to shtar girushin (divorce) and shichrur (freeing slaves) that aren't required for kiddushin (marriage). The shiur tackles why certain halachos like lishmah and mechubar appear on the list despite applying to kiddushin too. Rabbi Zweig distinguishes between dinim intrinsic to the shtar itself versus broader halachos, using this chakira to explain both Rashi (רש"י)'s and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s approaches to the Gemara's formulation.
The shiur opens with a fundamental question on Gittin 7a: the Gemara (גמרא) presents a list comparing the halachos of gittin (divorce documents), shichrur avadim (documents freeing slaves), and shtarei kiddushin (marriage documents), stating that certain requirements apply to gittin and shichrur but not to kiddushin. Yet the Gemara acknowledges "isubik kiddushin lo katani" — there are halachos that do apply to kiddushin that the Gemara doesn't list. The difficulty is: why didn't the Gemara include those halachos in its comparative list? Rabbi Zweig proposes a fundamental chakira (conceptual distinction): the Gemara's list only includes dinim that are intrinsic to hilchos shtar—the laws of the document itself. Halachos that extend beyond the technical laws of document writing, even if they apply to these documents, are excluded from the comparison. This explains why "baal korcho" (against one's will) isn't on the list—it's not a din in the shtar per se, but rather a broader halachic principle about the validity of the transaction.
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Gittin 7a
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