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The Gemara (גמרא) lists six halachos common to shtar girushin (divorce) and shichrur (freeing slaves) that aren't required for kiddushin (marriage). The shiur tackles why certain halachos like lishmah and mechubar appear on the list despite applying to kiddushin too. Rabbi Zweig distinguishes between dinim intrinsic to the shtar itself versus broader halachos, using this chakira to explain both Rashi (רש"י)'s and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s approaches to the Gemara's formulation.
The shiur opens with a fundamental question on Gittin 7a: the Gemara (גמרא) presents a list comparing the halachos of gittin (divorce documents), shichrur avadim (documents freeing slaves), and shtarei kiddushin (marriage documents), stating that certain requirements apply to gittin and shichrur but not to kiddushin. Yet the Gemara acknowledges "isubik kiddushin lo katani" — there are halachos that do apply to kiddushin that the Gemara doesn't list. The difficulty is: why didn't the Gemara include those halachos in its comparative list? Rabbi Zweig proposes a fundamental chakira (conceptual distinction): the Gemara's list only includes dinim that are intrinsic to hilchos shtar—the laws of the document itself. Halachos that extend beyond the technical laws of document writing, even if they apply to these documents, are excluded from the comparison. This explains why "baal korcho" (against one's will) isn't on the list—it's not a din in the shtar per se, but rather a broader halachic principle about the validity of the transaction.
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Gittin 7a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
