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Can one be mekadesh a woman by forgiving a loan or extending payment time? Rashi (רש"י) holds one is mekadesh with the service (what someone would pay for), not the subjective hana'ah. The Rambam (רמב"ם) rejects this entirely: only actual kesef creates kiddushin. The shiur explores whether the borrower's own mechila counts as "service" and whether such an arrangement is binding.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kiddushin 6b dealing with whether a creditor can be mekadesh a woman by forgiving a loan or extending the time for repayment. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses several scenarios: forgiving a loan entirely (mechilah), extending the payment deadline (harbakas zman), and the question of whether either constitutes ribis (usury). Rashi (רש"י)'s position, as understood by the shiur, is that one cannot be mekadesh with hana'ah (subjective benefit) but only with a service that has objective value. When Rashi discusses "hana'os mechilah," he means the pruta that someone would pay another person to accomplish the same result—convincing the creditor to forgive or extend. This is a service, not mere hana'ah. The shiur emphasizes that Rashi holds the woman can even pay the creditor directly (not just a third party) for this service, as long as it is not considered ribis.
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Kiddushin 6b
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