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How does revoking a get (divorce document) work? The shiur analyzes the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s distinctive position that bitul ha-get is not an act destroying a document in the present, but rather a retraction of one's original will (ratzon) to divorce. This reading resolves fundamental tensions in the Gemara (גמרא) and explains the difference between revoking the agent's agency (bitul ha-shlichut) versus revoking the get itself.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Gittin 32b, focusing on the conceptual nature of bitul ha-get (revoking a divorce document) according to the Rambam (רמב"ם). The discussion begins with the Gemara (גמרא)'s treatment of language used in revoking gifts (matana) versus divorce documents, establishing that certain verbal formulations work for one but not the other. The central question explored is the fundamental machloket (dispute) between Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam regarding what bitul ha-get means conceptually. According to Rashi, when one revokes a get, one is performing an act in the future—destroying or invalidating the document itself (lo asi dibur mevatel ma'aseh—speech cannot undo a physical deed). The Gemara's discussion of whether one can be chozer (retract) reflects this understanding that some action is being done to the document.
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Gittin 32b
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