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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) teach that Hashem (ה׳) shows mercy *before* a person sins, when He already knows the sin will happen? The Rosh explains that even though Hashem knows our future, He relates to us "b'asher hu sham"—as we are now—so we don't live in constant fear and anxiety. This allows us to serve Him from a place of comfort rather than dread.
The shiur explores a fundamental question raised by the Gemara (גמרא)'s teaching about the Thirteen Attributes of Mercy. The Gemara on Daf Yud Zayin (17) explains that when the Torah (תורה) says "Hashem (ה׳), Hashem," one mention refers to Hashem's mercy before a person sins, and one refers to His mercy after the person sins. The Rosh asks a pointed question: what does it mean that Hashem exercises mercy before someone sins? The Rosh's first answer is that HaKadosh Baruch Hu knows a person is going to sin, yet nevertheless deals with that person "b'asher hu sham"—according to how the person is at that moment. This is an expression of Divine mercy. However, the Or HaChaim raises a compelling challenge to this understanding. If Hashem's mercy consists of not punishing someone before they sin simply because He knows they will sin, that would not be a meaningful attribute at all. By that logic, Hashem could punish anyone even before they were born based on future knowledge, making the entire creation purposeless. The Or HaChaim argues that of course Hashem doesn't punish before the sin occurs—that cannot be what the Rosh means by Divine mercy.
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Rosh Hashanah 17b
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