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When a father gifts property to his son with the condition "after my death," who owns what? The shiur analyzes the fundamental machlokes between Rav Yochanan and Reish Lakish over whether kinyan peiros (usufruct) equals kinyan haguf (ownership of the corpus). This dispute determines whether the son can sell the property now and what happens if he predeceases his father.
This shiur presents a deep analysis of a fundamental dispute in Yevamos 36b regarding the nature of property ownership when divided between kinyan haguf (ownership of the physical property) and kinyan peiros (rights to the fruits/use). The context is a father who gives property to his son with the stipulation that full ownership takes effect only after the father's death. During the father's lifetime, the father retains the peiros while the son has a claim to the guf. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a machlokes between Rav Yochanan and Reish Lakish. According to Rav Yochanan, kinyan peiros is like kinyan haguf—whoever controls the use effectively controls the ownership. According to Reish Lakish, kinyan peiros is NOT like kinyan haguf—the corpus can be dealt with as a separate, transferable entity independent of who enjoys the fruits.
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Yevamos 36b
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