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What happens when a shliach bringing a get from overseas cannot say "befanai nichtav, befanai nechtam"? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s case of nischarish (became deaf-mute) versus nishtateik (became mute), revealing three distinct halachos: when the meshaleach must write a new get, when the shliach must re-deliver, and when yiskayim bechoisvo suffices without further action.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin regarding the requirement for a shliach bringing a get from overseas to declare "befanai nichtav, befanai nechtam" (in my presence it was written and signed). The Mishna teaches that if the shliach is unable to say this, the get is validated through yiskayim bechoisvo—witnesses testifying to the signatures. The Gemara asks why we need Rav Yosef's case when the Mishna itself teaches yiskayim bechoisvo, and answers that the Mishna refers specifically to ein yacho l'omeir (he is unable to say). The Marsha raises Tosafos (תוספות)'s question: Why doesn't the Mishna use the case of an ilem (mute person)? If the case were an ilem, everything would work smoothly—he could serve as a valid shliach, and he could write down the testimony of lishmo in writing, satisfying both requirements. The Gemara would have no need for the complex proof from Ravina and Rav. Tosafos answers that the expression "v'lo yomar" (and he did not say) wouldn't fit an ilem, leading to the conclusion that the case must be a cheireish (deaf-mute).
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Gittin (daf and side discussed throughout)
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