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How can one violate bal ta'achar (delaying a vow) in nazirus when saying "harei'ni nazir" makes you a nazir immediately? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between two types of neder-commitments: the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s approach that a neder is a commitment to act (harei alai), requiring subsequent behavior to activate kedusha, versus the Ran and Ra'avad who require an actual chalos (kedusha taking effect) at some point to validate the neder.
This shiur addresses a fundamental problem in understanding how the prohibition of bal ta'achar (delaying fulfillment of a vow) applies to nazirus. The Gemara (גמרא) in Nedarim discusses the case of someone who says "lo yefter min ha'olam achei hei nazir" (I will not die until I am a nazir), and concludes that if he delays becoming a nazir, he violates bal ta'achar. However, this creates a seeming contradiction: when someone says "harei'ni nazir," he becomes a nazir immediately, and there can be no bal ta'achar because there is no delay. The Gemara itself states that once someone says harei'ni nazir, "kam lei b'bal ya'achol" - if he violates the prohibition by drinking wine, he has transgressed a lav. How then can there be bal ta'achar? The Rishonim struggle to explain this apparent contradiction. The Ran suggests that when someone says "lo yefter min ha'olam," he means to accept nazirus in such a way that there will be no concern that he might violate bal ta'achar. However, Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that the Ran's position is internally contradictory. The Ran seems to suggest that this creates an immediate obligation to accept nazirus, yet also states that someone who simply says "harei alai" becomes a nazir immediately. The question becomes: what is the difference between these formulations?
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Nedarim 2a
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