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Can multiple prohibitions apply to a single forbidden relationship? The shiur analyzes Yevamos 5a's discussion of whether shomeres yavam shel aviv violates one prohibition or three (dodoso, yevamah reshus, and shomeres yavam), exploring the principle of "lav ha'lav bi'shnei lavin" and its implications. The Gemara (גמרא)'s question about why the passage is "muchak" (out of place) reveals a fundamental dispute about whether shomeres yavam creates an actual issur ervah or merely a kibud av issue.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Yevamos 5a regarding the nature of multiple prohibitions (lavim) that apply to a single forbidden relationship. The discussion centers on the case of shomeres yavam shel aviv (one's father's yevamah) and whether she is prohibited by one, two, or three separate prohibitions. The Gemara (גמרא) introduces the concept of "lav ha'lav bi'shnei lavin" - that a single action can violate multiple prohibitions. Rabbi Zweig explains that this does not mean simply adding punishments, but rather recognizes that a single act can violate multiple distinct aspects of Torah (תורה) law. He illustrates this with the example of theft: lo sigzol (prohibition against robbery) and lo sachmod (prohibition against coveting) represent two different aspects of wrongdoing - one focuses on causing monetary loss, the other on the improper desire itself.
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Yevamos 5a
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