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Can multiple prohibitions apply to a single forbidden relationship? The shiur analyzes Yevamos 5a's discussion of whether shomeres yavam shel aviv violates one prohibition or three (dodoso, yevamah reshus, and shomeres yavam), exploring the principle of "lav ha'lav bi'shnei lavin" and its implications. The Gemara (גמרא)'s question about why the passage is "muchak" (out of place) reveals a fundamental dispute about whether shomeres yavam creates an actual issur ervah or merely a kibud av issue.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Yevamos 5a regarding the nature of multiple prohibitions (lavim) that apply to a single forbidden relationship. The discussion centers on the case of shomeres yavam shel aviv (one's father's yevamah) and whether she is prohibited by one, two, or three separate prohibitions. The Gemara (גמרא) introduces the concept of "lav ha'lav bi'shnei lavin" - that a single action can violate multiple prohibitions. Rabbi Zweig explains that this does not mean simply adding punishments, but rather recognizes that a single act can violate multiple distinct aspects of Torah (תורה) law. He illustrates this with the example of theft: lo sigzol (prohibition against robbery) and lo sachmod (prohibition against coveting) represent two different aspects of wrongdoing - one focuses on causing monetary loss, the other on the improper desire itself.
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Yevamos 5a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
