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What makes kinui v'stira sufficient to prohibit a woman to her husband while pesach (פסח) pasuach (his testimony) is not? The shiur analyzes the fundamental machloket between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot on whether eid kiyum is required for isurei nashim. Rashi holds that isur la'baal requires explicit warning (kinui), while Tosafot maintains you need formal eidim like in kiddushin.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of a complex sugya in Kesubos 9a dealing with the halachic requirements for prohibiting a married woman to her husband after adultery. The central question revolves around understanding why kinui v'stira (warning and seclusion followed by testimony) can render a woman forbidden to her husband, while pesach (פסח) pasuach (the husband's own testimony that he saw her commit adultery) cannot. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a fundamental kasha: if we say that pesach pasuach is not believed because even if the husband saw eidim witnessing his wife's adultery she wouldn't be forbidden to him, then what case of kinui v'stira would actually prohibit her? This leads to a deeper analysis of what constitutes sufficient testimony in matters of isurei nashim.
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Kesubos 9a
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