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Why does Tosafos (תוספות) treat puncturing a boil as davar she'eino miskaven while Riva categorizes it as melacha she'ain tzricha l'gufa? The shiur develops the distinction: davar she'eino miskaven requires no intention for the melacha at all, while melacha she'ain tzricha l'gufa involves intention for the melacha but not its primary purpose. This chakira impacts whether psik reisha d'lo nichle is permitted on Shabbos (שבת) versus other issurim.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute between Tosafos (תוספות) and Riva regarding the proper categorization of certain borderline Shabbos (שבת) cases. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos discusses whether certain actions constitute davar she'eino miskaven (unintended consequences) or melacha she'ain tzricha l'gufa (work not done for its primary purpose), with significantly different halachic implications. The core disagreement centers on cases like mafis mursa (lancing a boil). Tosafos categorizes this as davar she'eino miskaven with psik reisha d'lo nichle - one punctures the boil to remove painful pus, and while air inevitably enters (psik reisha), one doesn't care about the air entry (lo nichle). According to the Ra'ah, this should be permitted. However, Riva argues this is actually melacha she'ain tzricha l'gufa - one is performing an act of binyan (construction/repair) on the body but not for the purpose of healing, only for pain relief.
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Kesubos 5b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
