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Why does Tosafos (תוספות) treat puncturing a boil as davar she'eino miskaven while Riva categorizes it as melacha she'ain tzricha l'gufa? The shiur develops the distinction: davar she'eino miskaven requires no intention for the melacha at all, while melacha she'ain tzricha l'gufa involves intention for the melacha but not its primary purpose. This chakira impacts whether psik reisha d'lo nichle is permitted on Shabbos (שבת) versus other issurim.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute between Tosafos (תוספות) and Riva regarding the proper categorization of certain borderline Shabbos (שבת) cases. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos discusses whether certain actions constitute davar she'eino miskaven (unintended consequences) or melacha she'ain tzricha l'gufa (work not done for its primary purpose), with significantly different halachic implications. The core disagreement centers on cases like mafis mursa (lancing a boil). Tosafos categorizes this as davar she'eino miskaven with psik reisha d'lo nichle - one punctures the boil to remove painful pus, and while air inevitably enters (psik reisha), one doesn't care about the air entry (lo nichle). According to the Ra'ah, this should be permitted. However, Riva argues this is actually melacha she'ain tzricha l'gufa - one is performing an act of binyan (construction/repair) on the body but not for the purpose of healing, only for pain relief.
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Kesubos 5b
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