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Why does migu work when she claims 'mesirastani nanasti' but could have claimed 'mukaseitz ani tachtecha'? The shiur distinguishes between regular migu (schusa taina) and migu in boreir veshema cases, where you need kush dekamra—evidence the claimant is truthful—not just a winning argument.
This advanced Gemara (גמרא) shiur analyzes the complex sugya of migu (legal presumption) in cases of boreir veshema (one party certain, one uncertain) on Kesubos 13a. The central question revolves around why a woman claiming 'mesirastani nanasti' (I was seduced) is believed based on migu—she could have claimed 'mukaseitz ani tachtecha' (I am divorced) and received her kesuba. Rabbi Zweig addresses fundamental difficulties in understanding this migu. The Rashba argues there is no real migu here because even if she claimed 'mukaseitz ani tachtecha,' she wouldn't be more believed—the migu lacks the typical advantage of schusa taina (a superior claim). Tosafos (תוספות) attempts to resolve this by saying it's not a complete migu, calling it 'taina mula b'yosa' (a somewhat effective argument).
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Kesubos 13a
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