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Why did God permit Noach to eat meat after the flood but forbid Adam from doing so? The Gemara (גמרא) reveals a fundamental principle: one may only use what one has contributed to bringing into existence. Since Adam found animals already created, he had no right to take their lives, but Noach saved the animals from total destruction and thereby earned ownership over them.
This shiur explores a fundamental principle governing man's relationship with creation through the lens of why Adam HaRishon was forbidden to eat meat while Noach was permitted to do so after the flood. The discussion begins by examining an apparent contradiction in the Torah (תורה)'s account of creation. On the third day, the Torah states that vegetation sprouted from the earth, but later it says that nothing had yet grown because there was no rain and no man to work the land. The Gemara (גמרא) in Chulin 60b resolves this by explaining that on the third day, plants only emerged to just below ground level and remained there until Adam prayed for rain, which then allowed them to fully sprout. This teaches that Adam actually contributed to bringing vegetation into existence through his prayers and labor. The shiur then applies this principle to the question of eating meat. While Adam contributed to the growth of vegetation through his prayers and agricultural work, he played no role in creating the animals, which were formed on the fifth and sixth days of creation before he could contribute to their existence. Since Adam found the animals already fully formed, he had no right to take their lives for food. The underlying principle is that one may only use what one has contributed to bringing into being - this is how man earns his sustenance and maintains his independence.
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Chulin 60b
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