No community start suggestion yet.
Why does our Gemara (גמרא) say mifkad pokeach exempts from mefarek while another Gemara rules it obligates? The shiur resolves this contradiction by distinguishing two types of mefarek: one derived from dosh requiring tikkun ha'ochel, and another learned from milah requiring only separation.
The shiur addresses a fundamental contradiction in Talmudic rulings regarding the melacha of mefarek (extracting). Our Gemara (גמרא) states that if blood is mifkad pokeach (loosely attached), one is exempt from mefarek, but the Gemara in Sukkah rules that extracting wine from grapes or oil from olives (both mifkad pokeach) does obligate for mefarek. Rabbi Zweig analyzes this through the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position that the melacha discussed here is mefarek, not nesilas neshama as Tosafos (תוספות) holds. The resolution centers on distinguishing two distinct types of mefarek. The first type, derived from the av melacha of dosh (threshing), requires both that one needs the extracted substance (tzorech ha'dam) and that it constitutes a tikkun ha'ochel (improvement of food). This is exemplified by extracting grain from chaff - taking something useful from something unusable. When extracting blood by wounding, if done merely to harm (miskaven la'hazik), it's considered mekalkel (destructive) rather than tikkun, even if the blood could theoretically be used.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 5b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
