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Why does Tosafot call squeezing a rag "psik reisha lo nichle" if the person doesn't want the liquid? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: one action with two results can be called ein mechaven when you intend the action but not the melacha accomplishment. This differs from melacha she'ain tzrich l'gufa where you intend the melacha but for the wrong purpose.
The shiur analyzes a complex Tosafot on Kesubos 6a regarding the issur of squeezing a rag on Shabbos (שבת). Rabbeinu Tam argues it cannot be assur because of libun (cleaning) since we don't make gezeiros on beshar mashkin (meat and liquids), and it cannot be mefarek (squeezing) because it's holech l'ibud (going to waste). However, Tosafot calls this a case of psik reisha lo nichle (inevitable unintended consequence). Rav Kivager challenges Tosafot's position with two fundamental questions: First, if the person doesn't want the liquid that comes out, how can this be called psik reisha at all? Psik reisha means you're doing the melacha but don't want it - but if you don't want the liquid, you haven't done the melacha of mefarek at all. Second, psik reisha lo nichle cannot be better than melacha she'ain tzrich l'gufa, and according to Rabbi Yehuda (whom Rav apparently follows), melacha she'ain tzrich l'gufa is chayav.
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Kesubos 6a
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