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Why does Rashi (רש"י) give different tests for psik reisha on different daf pages? The shiur develops a yesod that when an action itself is forbidden, lo ichpas lei doesn't help. But when kavanah creates the issur (melechet machshevet), then lo ichpas lei prevents psik reisha liability.
The shiur addresses a fundamental contradiction in Rashi (רש"י)'s approach to psik reisha between Kesubos 5b (daf kuf gimel) and 85b (daf ayin hei). On daf kuf gimel, Rashi holds that lo ichpas lei (not caring about the consequence) exempts from psik reisha, while on daf ayin hei, he requires lo nichleh (actively not wanting it). Rabbi Zweig resolves this by establishing that the nature of the forbidden act determines the psik reisha standard. When the action itself has no inherent Shabbos (שבת) definition and only becomes forbidden through one's intention (like pulling something from the ground), then lo ichpas lei suffices. The kavanah defines the melacha - if you intend ketzira (harvesting), the incidental binyan (building/improving the ground) isn't considered psik reisha. However, when the action inherently constitutes a forbidden melacha (like squeezing a chilazon which is inherently netilas neshama), then even without intention for that specific result, lo ichpas lei doesn't help - you need lo nichleh. The Maharal asks a penetrating question on the Rosh and Ran: they first distinguish between Shabbos (where lo ichpas lei works) and kol haTorah kulah (where it doesn't), but then cite proofs from kol haTorah kulah showing the opposite. Rabbi Zweig explains this isn't a contradiction but reflects a deeper principle: the distinction isn't geographic (Shabbos vs. other areas) but conceptual (melechet machshevet vs. ma'aseh issur). Some prohibitions in kol haTorah kulah also depend on intention - like shatnez, where wearing as a mannequin isn't ma'aseh levusha and thus permitted. The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of pouring wine on the mizbeach altar illustrates this principle. Initially, the Gemara treats extinguishing the altar fire as a ma'aseh issur, making lo ichpas lei irrelevant. But the Gemara's conclusion suggests that the issur of kibui (extinguishing) requires intention - you must want to extinguish for it to be forbidden. When done carelessly (using large drops instead of small ones), Rashi explains this as laziness, not intention to extinguish, thus avoiding psik reisha liability. This demonstrates that even within kol haTorah kulah, some issurim function like Shabbos when they require specific kavanah.
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Why does halacha forbid entering dangerous places if everything happens by Divine decree? The shiur examines the debate between Rashi and Tosfos on traveling at night, developing a fundamental distinction: Rashi holds one must avoid even deserved punishments that Hashem delays through mercy, while Tosfos holds the prohibition addresses self-inflicted harm through free will. This framework reveals how people rationalize self-destructive behavior as "hashgacha."
Why does the Gemara praise hospitality to scholars as a unique mitzvah rather than ordinary hachnasas orchim? The shiur distinguishes two mitzvahs: hachnasas orchim (providing for those in need) and connecting to talmidei chachamim (cleaving to God through scholars). Yisro's meal for the Jewish leaders wasn't charity—it was his way of bonding with those transformed by Torah, teaching that learning must fundamentally change who we are.
Kesubos 5b
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