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When two people perform an action together on Shabbos (שבת), are both liable or only one? The shiur distinguishes two separate Gemara (גמרא) frameworks: liability based on creating a result (only one liable) versus liability for performing melacha itself (both liable). This chakira resolves the machlokes between Tosafos (תוספות) and Rambam (רמב"ם) and explains parallel cases in damages law.
This shiur explores a profound machlokes between Tosafos (תוספות) and Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding the fundamental nature of liability when two people perform actions together on Shabbos (שבת). Rabbi Zweig presents a novel approach that there are actually two distinct sugyas in the Gemara (גמרא) dealing with different types of liability. The first sugya (daf gimel) deals with liability based on creating a result (totza'ah) - specifically chilul Shabbos. According to this framework, only one person can be liable because there is only one result created. The second sugya (daf 93) introduces a different principle - that there is inherent liability for performing melacha on Shabbos, regardless of the result achieved. Under this framework, both people can be liable because each person is performing an action. Tosafos understands that these represent two different legal principles that can operate independently. The Rambam, however, rules that in cases of true partnership (shutfus), both parties are liable because each assists the other in performing the complete melacha. Rabbi Zweig extends this analysis to resolve apparent contradictions in other areas of halacha (הלכה), particularly regarding kofer (damages for killing with an ox). He explains that initially the Gemara assumed kofer was payment for the loss of a soul (ibud neshamah), which would mean only one person could be liable. However, the Gemara's conclusion is that kofer is payment for negligence in guarding the ox, which allows multiple people to be liable. This principle explains why the Rambam can rule that multiple people pay kofer while maintaining that only one person is liable when the liability is truly based on a single result. The shiur also addresses Rashi (רש"י)'s approach to the requirement of l'chalaik (separate liability for each melacha), explaining that there are two distinct types of prohibitions on Shabbos: the prohibition against performing melacha (which applies to each individual action) and the prohibition against desecrating Shabbos (which may require a more comprehensive violation).
Shabbos 3a, 93b
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