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Why does the opening Mishna describe carrying violations as 'two that are four' instead of simply listing four cases? The shiur develops the yesod that Torah (תורה) violations require both akirah and hanachah by the same person, while the additional Rabbinic cases involve split actions. This principle explains Rashi (רש"י)'s cryptic language about 'lechatchilah' and 'im asa patur' in defining when incomplete carrying actions create liability.
Rabbi Zweig begins his study of Masechta Shabbos (שבת) by analyzing the opening Mishna on daf 2a, which states 'Yitzias Hashabas shtayim shehein arba b'fnim' - there are two Torah (תורה)-level carrying violations that become four when accounting for different perspectives. He explains the fundamental concepts of reshus hayachid (private domain) and reshus harabim (public domain), noting that these have specific definitions for Shabbos laws that differ from their meanings in other areas of halacha (הלכה). The shiur explores the Biblical source for the prohibition of carrying, examining the debate between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding the derivation from the verse about Moshe telling the people not to bring materials for the Mishkan. Rashi derives it from 'vayetzad Moshe vayaviru kol bamachaneh' while Tosafos prefers 'al yetzei ish mimkomo.' The discussion delves into Rashi's interpretation that 'b'fnim' refers to someone standing inside who can perform both hotza'ah (taking out) and hachnasa (bringing in), while 'bachutz' refers to someone standing outside. A significant portion examines the four Rabbinic prohibitions (shehem arba midivrei sofrim) and Rashi's cryptic phrase 'lesa lechatchilah' and 'im asa patur.' Rabbi Zweig struggles with understanding what 'lechatchilah' means in this context and explores various interpretations. The shiur also analyzes cases where one person begins a melacha and another completes it, discussing when there is liability and when activities are considered 'lav midi avid' (not having done anything significant). The analysis includes comparison with the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation and explores the technical requirements of akirah (picking up) and hanachah (putting down) in the laws of carrying.
Shabbos 2a
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