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How can a child both honor a parent who violates Torah (תורה) while being exempt from certain parental obligations? The shiur distinguishes between rights-based honor (what parents can claim) and mitzvah (מצוה)-based honor (the child's religious duty). Wicked parents forfeit their rights but the child's fundamental obligation to honor remains intact.
Rabbi Zweig presents a comprehensive analysis of a fundamental tension in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s codification of the laws of honoring parents who violate Torah (תורה). The shiur begins with the Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin which states that when Rav Yehuda criticized his father's Torah interpretation, he was told this was inappropriate - one should not challenge a parent by saying 'Father, you have transgressed Torah law' but rather should state the relevant Torah passage factually. The Rambam presents two different approaches to this scenario: In Hilchot Mamrim, he rules that one should ask the parent as a student would ('you taught us such and such'), while in Hilchot Talmud (תלמוד) Torah, he prescribes giving honor through respectful statement ('our teacher taught us this way'). The Kesef Mishneh attempts to resolve this by claiming both derive from the same Gemara, but this creates the problem of how one source can yield contradictory methodologies. Rabbi Zweig analyzes the Rambam's position that even a mamzer (illegitimate child) or child of a complete rasha (wicked person) remains obligated in parental honor, though exempt from the prohibitions against striking and cursing due to the principle of 'eino oseh ma'aseh amcha' (not acting as part of the nation). This leads to a fundamental question: what constitutes the prohibition against striking such a parent, and how can there be an obligation in honor while exemption from other duties? Through analysis of Gemara Sanhedrin's discussion of one who goes out to execution, Rabbi Zweig develops the principle that the prohibition (lav) against striking remains even when the punishment (onesh) is waived. The lav focuses on the perpetrator's wrongdoing in cursing or striking, while the punishment depends on the victim's status. When someone is 'eino oseh ma'aseh amcha,' they lose certain protections regarding punishment, but the fundamental prohibition on the actor remains intact. Rabbi Zweig then explores whether parental honor represents the parent's rights or the child's obligations. Through analysis of whether support is 'mi-shel av' (from father's funds) or 'mi-shel ben' (from son's funds), he demonstrates that the Rambam views it as the child's obligation. However, he distinguishes between two types of honor: rights-based honor (during the parent's lifetime when they benefit) and mitzvah (מצוה)-based honor (purely the child's religious duty). When a parent is 'eino oseh ma'aseh amcha,' they forfeit their rights-based claims but the child's mitzvah-based obligations remain. This resolves the apparent contradiction in returning usurious interest - when the father has rights, the son must spend money to restore them, but when those rights are forfeited due to the father's status, only the mitzvah-obligation remains, which doesn't require monetary expenditure. The shiur concludes by applying this framework to resolve the Rambam's different formulations: both derive from the same Gemara source, with one reflecting the baseline requirement not to disgrace (from the Gemara's question) and the other reflecting the positive obligation to honor (from the Gemara's conclusion).
Kiddushin 32a
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