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Why can beis din convert a minor without his consent when we normally can't act on someone's behalf without their permission? The Gemara (גמרא)'s comparison to acquiring property for another person raises fundamental questions about the nature of conversion. Rashi (רש"י)'s approach distinguishes between lifestyle issues (where proper chinuch prevents later rejection) and inherent desires (where even minors will eventually rebel).
This shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of converting a minor (ger katan) through beis din without the child's consent. The fundamental question is how this fits with the general principle that one cannot acquire something for another person that might be detrimental to them (ein choven l'adam shelo befanav). The Gemara compares this to the principle of zachin l'adam shelo befanav (we can act for someone's benefit in their absence), suggesting that conversion is beneficial for the child. However, this raises a conceptual difficulty: how can conversion, which involves taking on the burden of mitzvah (מצוה) observance, be compared to acquiring property or other material benefits? The shiur explores Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation of why conversion is considered beneficial for a minor but potentially burdensome for an adult. Rashi explains that an adult who converts faces the challenge of tom tom di-isur (he has tasted forbidden pleasures), making Jewish observance feel restrictive. A child, however, hasn't yet developed these desires, so conversion represents pure benefit.
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Kesubos 11a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
