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Why can beis din convert a minor without his consent when we normally can't act on someone's behalf without their permission? The Gemara (גמרא)'s comparison to acquiring property for another person raises fundamental questions about the nature of conversion. Rashi (רש"י)'s approach distinguishes between lifestyle issues (where proper chinuch prevents later rejection) and inherent desires (where even minors will eventually rebel).
This shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of converting a minor (ger katan) through beis din without the child's consent. The fundamental question is how this fits with the general principle that one cannot acquire something for another person that might be detrimental to them (ein choven l'adam shelo befanav). The Gemara compares this to the principle of zachin l'adam shelo befanav (we can act for someone's benefit in their absence), suggesting that conversion is beneficial for the child. However, this raises a conceptual difficulty: how can conversion, which involves taking on the burden of mitzvah (מצוה) observance, be compared to acquiring property or other material benefits? The shiur explores Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation of why conversion is considered beneficial for a minor but potentially burdensome for an adult. Rashi explains that an adult who converts faces the challenge of tom tom di-isur (he has tasted forbidden pleasures), making Jewish observance feel restrictive. A child, however, hasn't yet developed these desires, so conversion represents pure benefit.
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Kesubos 11a
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