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Why doesn't a woman who claims relations occurred with a valid man have a migu to say no relations happened at all? Tosafot explains that chezkas beulah creates a real doubt, transforming migu from a winning argument into required proof. When afraid to make the alternative claim, migu cannot serve as reliable evidence.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Tosafot's explanation of Rabbi Yehoshua's position regarding chezkas beulah (presumption of relations) in cases of medaberet (a woman who can speak). Rabbi Zweig examines why a woman claiming she had relations with a valid man cannot use migu (she could have said) to claim no relations occurred at all. Tosafot explains that Rabbi Yehoshua learns from the case of shevuah that there exists a chezkas beulah - a presumption that relations occurred. This is based on the principle "ein apikatropus l'arayos" (there is no guardian for sexual matters). Unlike Rashi (רש"י)'s approach, where there is no fundamental doubt, Tosafot maintains that chezkas beulah creates a real safek (doubt) from the outset.
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Kesubos 13b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
