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Why doesn't a woman who claims relations occurred with a valid man have a migu to say no relations happened at all? Tosafot explains that chezkas beulah creates a real doubt, transforming migu from a winning argument into required proof. When afraid to make the alternative claim, migu cannot serve as reliable evidence.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Tosafot's explanation of Rabbi Yehoshua's position regarding chezkas beulah (presumption of relations) in cases of medaberet (a woman who can speak). Rabbi Zweig examines why a woman claiming she had relations with a valid man cannot use migu (she could have said) to claim no relations occurred at all. Tosafot explains that Rabbi Yehoshua learns from the case of shevuah that there exists a chezkas beulah - a presumption that relations occurred. This is based on the principle "ein apikatropus l'arayos" (there is no guardian for sexual matters). Unlike Rashi (רש"י)'s approach, where there is no fundamental doubt, Tosafot maintains that chezkas beulah creates a real safek (doubt) from the outset.
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Kesubos 13b
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