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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) ban poor-quality wicks for Chanukah (חנוכה) with 'kaf zeh zakuk lah' - if it goes out, relight it? The shiur contrasts Rashi (רש"י)'s view that hadlakas ner and pirsumei nisa are separate obligations versus the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position that candles going out invalidate the entire mitzvah (מצוה) retroactively.
This shiur analyzes a complex section of Masechta Shabbos (שבת) dealing with Chanukah (חנוכה) candle lighting and the principle of kaf zeh zakuk lah. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that certain poor-quality wicks and oils that are prone to going out cannot be used for Chanukah candles, leading to the principle that 'if it goes out, you must relight it.' Rabbi Zweig begins by questioning the Gemara's logical leap from discussing which materials can be used for lighting to establishing the principle of kaf zeh zakuk lah. He notes that just because something might go out doesn't necessarily mean you can't use it - perhaps you could simply relight it when it goes out. The Gemara then connects this to Shabbos restrictions, stating that these materials cannot be used 'neither on Shabbos nor during the week, neither for Chanukah.' This raises additional questions about why the same restrictions would apply to Chanukah candles as to Shabbos candles, given their different purposes. Rabbi Zweig explores Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation extensively. According to Rashi, the concern is 'dilma pasha v'lo mesakna' - perhaps the person will be negligent and not fix/relight the candle when it goes out. Rashi seems to hold that if someone lights a candle and walks away, and it goes out without their knowledge, they have still fulfilled the basic mitzvah (מצוה) of hadlakas ner (lighting the candle). However, there remains an additional obligation of pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle) that requires the candle to burn for the full required time. Rabbi Zweig contrasts this with the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s approach. The Rambam appears to hold that kaf zeh zakuk lah means that if the candle goes out and you don't relight it, you have accomplished nothing retroactively. According to this view, the entire mitzvah is invalidated if the candle doesn't burn for the required duration. This leads to different practical implications - according to Rashi, if you have no other candles available, you could still use these inferior ones and fulfill the basic obligation, while according to the Rambam, such candles are completely invalid (pasul) for the mitzvah. The shiur also addresses Tosafos (תוספות)' question about why the Gemara specifies both weekdays and Shabbos if the reason is simply kaf zeh zakuk lah. Tosafos argues that if the only concern were candles going out, there would be no need to distinguish between weekdays and Shabbos. This leads to the conclusion that there must be an additional reason for the Shabbos prohibition, namely the principle of mutar lishtamesh l'orahh (whether one may derive benefit from the Chanukah lights). Rabbi Zweig extends this analysis to practical questions about Erev Shabbos, citing the Trumas HaDeshen's ruling about candles that go out before the required time on Friday evening. He explains how the different understandings of kaf zeh zakuk lah would affect the halacha (הלכה) in such cases. The shiur concludes by examining how these different approaches affect the understanding of hiddur mitzvah (beautifying the commandment) - whether one may use inferior candles for additional lights beyond the basic requirement.
Shabbos 21a-b
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