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Why can witnesses make someone a ben gerusha or ben chalutza if it's eidus she'ata yochel l'hazem (testimony you cannot contradict)? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between testimony establishing facts for the world versus putting a psak directly on the person. When beis din cannot put a formal psak on someone, there's no kashas zamam liability for false witnesses.
This shiur addresses the complex question raised by Tosafos (תוספות) in Makkos regarding how witnesses can make someone a ben gerusha (son of a divorcee) or ben chalutza when such testimony constitutes eidus she'ata yochel l'hazem (testimony that cannot be contradicted through hazamah). The fundamental issue is how beis din can accept such testimony and how the principle of kashas zamam (making false witnesses suffer what they intended) applies. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the position of the Ritva, who distinguishes between ben gerusha (which is d'oraisa) and ben chalutza (which is only d'rabbanan). Rav Yehuda in Tosafos Kiddushin questions this distinction, arguing that even for d'rabbanan matters, witnesses who testify falsely violate lo sa'aneh and should receive malkos. The shiur then explores why Tosafos in Kesubos asks a different question than our Tosafos - focusing on how the witnesses receive malkos rather than how the person becomes disqualified.
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Makkos 2a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
