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Why can witnesses make someone a ben gerusha or ben chalutza if it's eidus she'ata yochel l'hazem (testimony you cannot contradict)? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction between testimony establishing facts for the world versus putting a psak directly on the person. When beis din cannot put a formal psak on someone, there's no kashas zamam liability for false witnesses.
This shiur addresses the complex question raised by Tosafos (תוספות) in Makkos regarding how witnesses can make someone a ben gerusha (son of a divorcee) or ben chalutza when such testimony constitutes eidus she'ata yochel l'hazem (testimony that cannot be contradicted through hazamah). The fundamental issue is how beis din can accept such testimony and how the principle of kashas zamam (making false witnesses suffer what they intended) applies. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the position of the Ritva, who distinguishes between ben gerusha (which is d'oraisa) and ben chalutza (which is only d'rabbanan). Rav Yehuda in Tosafos Kiddushin questions this distinction, arguing that even for d'rabbanan matters, witnesses who testify falsely violate lo sa'aneh and should receive malkos. The shiur then explores why Tosafos in Kesubos asks a different question than our Tosafos - focusing on how the witnesses receive malkos rather than how the person becomes disqualified.
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Makkos 2a
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
