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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) prohibit certain oils for Chanukah (חנוכה) lighting based on whether you must relight if they go out? The shiur uses the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s distinction between hadlakah (instantaneous lighting like the Temple) and pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle) as two separate mitzvos. This dual framework resolves the apparent contradictions about oil requirements and Erev Shabbos (שבת) timing.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Shabbos (שבת) 21a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of which oils may be used for Chanukah (חנוכה) lighting. The central question revolves around the principle of 'kaf se zakuk la' (if it goes out, you must relight it) versus 'kaf se ein zakuk la' (if it goes out, you don't relight it), and how this affects the permissibility of using oils that may extinguish quickly. Rabbi Zweig examines Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that the concern is 'shema yifsha' (lest one become negligent), questioning how negligence applies when someone has just carefully lit the menorah. The shiur explores Tosfos' challenge: how does the Gemara know that Rav Huna's position about Erev Shabbos is based on concerns about not being able to relight, rather than the general prohibition that applies during the week? The Gemara's resolution involves the principle of 'lashiyur' - that there is a requirement for sufficient oil to burn for the prescribed time. Rabbi Zweig presents the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s historical introduction to Chanukah laws as establishing two separate mitzvos: hadlakah (lighting) which mimics the Temple menorah, and pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle) which requires lighting outside at night. According to this understanding, the mitzvah (מצוה) of hadlakah is fulfilled instantaneously upon lighting, while pirsumei nisa creates additional requirements for timing and location. This framework helps resolve the apparent contradictions in the Gemara's positions. The shiur examines various Rishonim's approaches to whether Chanukah lighting on Erev Shabbos follows the same rules as during the week, with some holding that the instantaneous nature of hadlakah allows for earlier lighting before Shabbos. The analysis concludes with practical implications for understanding when brachos may be recited and how the dual nature of Chanukah obligations affects the technical requirements for proper fulfillment of the mitzvah.
Shabbos 21a
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