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When can false witnesses be executed for their lies? The shiur analyzes when a person becomes bar chiyuv (liable for execution) and shows that if lying witnesses testify on the same case, they undermine the bar chiyuv status. This is because lying witnesses would likely contradict earlier true witnesses through hakasha, making the entire testimony invalid.
This shiur tackles a fundamental difficulty in the Gemara (גמרא) regarding edim zomimim (conspiring witnesses) and the concept of bar chiyuv. The central issue is understanding when a person becomes liable for execution and how this affects the punishment of false witnesses. Rabbi Zweig begins by analyzing the dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding bar chiyuv. According to Rashi, a person is not bar chiyuv when witnesses have not yet come forward. Tosafos adds that even if witnesses exist, the person is only bar chiyuv when it's likely the beis din will carry out the verdict. This leads to the principle that the entire concept depends on whether there's a perversion of the judicial process (kashrus zman).
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Makkos 5a
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