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Why does Rashi (רש"י) require "lo nichlei" (actively not wanting the outcome) for psik reisha in one Gemara (גמרא) but only "lo ichpat lei" (indifference) in another? The shiur distinguishes two types of psik reisha: when performing two separate actions versus one action with two potential purposes, each requiring different standards.
The shiur addresses a fundamental contradiction in Rashi (רש"י)'s approach to psik reisha d'lo nichlei across different sugyos in Shabbos (שבת). Rav Kivai Ger's question highlights that Rashi seems to require different standards: in one case demanding that one actively not want the unintended consequence (lo nichlei), while in another accepting mere indifference (lo ichpat lei). Rabbi Zweig resolves this by establishing two distinct categories of psik reisha. The first type involves performing two separate actions simultaneously, where one is intended and the other unavoidable but unwanted - such as extracting dye while removing blood from an animal. Here, since two distinct ma'asim are being performed, the halacha (הלכה) requires clear demonstration that the second action is actively unwanted (lo nichlei), not merely that one is indifferent to it. The second type involves one action that can potentially fulfill two different purposes or melachos - such as pulling weeds from the ground, which could constitute either plowing (chorish) or harvesting (kotzir) depending on intent. In this case, since only one ma'aseh is performed, mere lack of interest in the secondary purpose (lo ichpat lei) suffices to avoid liability for that secondary melacha. This distinction explains why melacha she'einah tzrichah l'gufah (work not needed for its usual purpose) applies differently in various contexts. When dealing with one action serving two purposes, the principle can create exemptions based on intent. However, when two separate actions are involved, melacha she'einah tzrichah l'gufah cannot transform one established melacha into liability for a completely different one. The shiur further explores how this framework resolves the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s seemingly contradictory rulings on various Shabbos scenarios, including the case of opening an abscess and pulling vegetation from the ground, showing how each fits into one of these two categories of psik reisha.
Shabbos 103a
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