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Does kol hamekadeish al daas Rabanan mekadeish require religious consent or sovereign recognition? The shiur develops two approaches: Tosafot views it as requiring religious compliance (invalidating improper conduct), while Rashi (רש"י) sees it as seeking state authority to enforce marital rights. This distinction explains their disagreement about applying the principle to cases of shaloh kehogen.
The shiur analyzes the fundamental principle of kol hamekadeish al daas Rabanan mekadeish and explores what "daas Rabanan" actually means. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos 3a discusses a case where there is oneis (duress) in a get, creating the problem of potentially permitting an eishet ish to the world. The Gemara resolves this through the principle that all marriages are conducted al daas Rabanan, allowing the Rabbanan to retroactively nullify the kiddushin. The core dispute centers on what constitutes "daas Rabanan." Tosafot distinguishes between cases where kiddushin was done improperly initially (like forcing a woman to marry) versus cases where proper kiddushin later encounters problems (like our get case). In improper cases, Tosafot says we use the power of hefker beis din hefker, while in proper cases we need kol hamekadeish al daas Rabanan. Crucially, Tosafot argues that when someone acts shaloh kehogen (improperly), they are not acting al daas Rabanan, so the principle cannot apply.
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Kesubos 3a
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