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What type of duress (ones) applies to divorce law? The Gemara (גמרא) appears to link general ones exemptions to specific get situations, but this creates fundamental contradictions. The analysis reveals that ones in divorce law operates as a claim (ta'anas ones) rather than an automatic exemption, distinguishing it from universal ones principles throughout halacha (הלכה).
This shiur analyzes a fundamental question in gittin: the nature and application of ones (duress/circumstances beyond one's control) in divorce law. The Gemara (גמרא) begins by discussing mezones (spousal support) obligations and transitions to the principle "le'inyan gittin ein ones" (regarding gittin, there is no ones). Rabbi Zweig identifies a fundamental difficulty: if ones is a universal Torah (תורה) principle that exempts from obligations, why does the Gemara need to specify its application or non-application to gittin? The shiur examines Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that distinguishes between different types of ones. Rashi explains that "ein ones bigitin" means "ein ta'anas ones bigitin" - there is no claim of ones in divorce matters. This means that even if circumstances of ones are objectively present and known, they don't automatically invalidate a conditional get unless the husband actively raises the claim. This differs fundamentally from other areas of halacha (הלכה) where ones operates as an automatic exemption.
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Kesubos 2a
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