A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
What type of duress (ones) applies to divorce law? The Gemara (גמרא) appears to link general ones exemptions to specific get situations, but this creates fundamental contradictions. The analysis reveals that ones in divorce law operates as a claim (ta'anas ones) rather than an automatic exemption, distinguishing it from universal ones principles throughout halacha (הלכה).
This shiur analyzes a fundamental question in gittin: the nature and application of ones (duress/circumstances beyond one's control) in divorce law. The Gemara (גמרא) begins by discussing mezones (spousal support) obligations and transitions to the principle "le'inyan gittin ein ones" (regarding gittin, there is no ones). Rabbi Zweig identifies a fundamental difficulty: if ones is a universal Torah (תורה) principle that exempts from obligations, why does the Gemara need to specify its application or non-application to gittin? The shiur examines Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that distinguishes between different types of ones. Rashi explains that "ein ones bigitin" means "ein ta'anas ones bigitin" - there is no claim of ones in divorce matters. This means that even if circumstances of ones are objectively present and known, they don't automatically invalidate a conditional get unless the husband actively raises the claim. This differs fundamentally from other areas of halacha (הלכה) where ones operates as an automatic exemption.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kesubos 2a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
