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How could King Dovid marry Bathsheba without violating the prohibition of adultery? The shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s two approaches: either it was forced (ones) or Bathsheba was already divorced through conditional gittin soldiers wrote before battle. The discussion focuses on Rashi (רש"י) vs. Tosafos (תוספות) regarding whether these gittin were conditional on death or non-return from war.
This shiur explores Kesubos 9b's discussion of the famous episode between King Dovid and Bathsheba, focusing on how Dovid could permissibly marry her without transgressing the prohibition against adultery (eishes ish). The Gemara (גמרא) presents two primary approaches to resolve this difficulty. The first approach suggests it was ones (forced circumstances), meaning Dovid was compelled by forces beyond his control, which would exempt Bathsheba from becoming forbidden to both her husband Uriah and to Dovid. However, the Achronim question whether ones truly removes the prohibition of echad haba'al echad habo'el (the law that a woman who commits adultery becomes forbidden to both her husband and her paramour), particularly when only one party was under duress.
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Kesubos 9b
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