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How can rabbis permit a woman to remarry when she received a get under duress? The Gemara (גמרא) introduces "kol mekadesh al da'as rabbanan" - every man marries contingent on rabbinic approval, allowing them to retroactively annul marriages. Rashi (רש"י) adds that this requires an actual get (even invalid), while Tosafos (תוספות) disagrees.
The shiur analyzes the fundamental Talmudic principle of "kol mekadesh al da'as rabbanan mekadesh" (Kesubos 2b), which grants the rabbis power to retroactively annul marriages. The context involves a woman who received a get (divorce document) under duress (ones), making it invalid by Torah (תורה) law, yet the Gemara (גמרא) permits her to remarry. The Gemara explains this through the principle that every man marries conditionally - subject to rabbinic approval - allowing the rabbis to declare the marriage never existed. Rashi (רש"י) provides a crucial interpretation that diverges from the simple reading of the Gemara. While the Gemara seems to say rabbis can simply annul any marriage they disapprove of, Rashi argues this power only applies when there is an actual get present, even if invalid. According to Rashi, the man's original consent to marry "al da'as rabbanan" only extends to cases where the rabbis validate a questionable get. This limits rabbinic power to situations involving divorce proceedings.
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Kesubos 2b
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